Rena's shipwrecking on Wednesday, October 5 has stirred mixed public opinion with the following a space where letters to Sun Media's editor are published.

Rena, a 236m container ship grounded on the Astrolabe Reef, 25km from Tauranga.

To have your letter to the editor published, email it to [email protected] with ‘Rena – letter to the editor' in the subject line.

Only letters accompanied their author's full name will be published.

Some members of the Rena salvage operation are further questioning why earlier action was not taken during the five calm days immediately after the grounding.

In a joint letter to SunLive, they take issue with PM John Key's assertion that while there was criticism over a lack of action, no-one actually came up with any suggestions of what to do.

They claim that these points were all suggested by locals in the marine industry.

These persons wish to remain unnamed, since they are directly involved in the current salvage operation and do not wish to jeopardize their positions.

'What could have happened with Rena:

1. 5 minutes past daylight Wed day 1. Mobilize Skookum, Forest Lady and Deliverance with 2 bitumen tankers on each. Begin shuttle transfer (100 tonne) per round trip of oil to shore, equals 2 ½ days to complete oil evac.

2. 5 minutes past daylight Wed day 1. Port of Tauranga oil spill response team mobilized and deploy a boom right around the Rena, which would have shown incredible competence and been a major PR coup.

3. 5 minutes past daylight Wed day 1. Instruct the captain to run all engines main and auxillary at full noise (main engine uses 5 tonnes per hour), equals 120 tonnes / day, 14 days to burn oil off up the funnel. This process would also have kept the oil hot in the tanks.

4. 5 minutes past daylight Wed day 1. Before the ship listed excessively, a team of local container stevedores release the sea lashings and the twist-locks from the bottom of each container stack, have tugs secured to the top and pull overboard up to 7 strings of containers and tow ashore.

5. Make provision to cut the remaining steel where the split has occurred and tow the stern section away. The forward section, begin surface cutting and removal of the superstructure and only 6% of this hull is underwater which could be dealt with when calm conditions prevail.

Rena woes by Tamsin Trainor

Michael Donovan

We tried to teach our three children to ‘think ahead' in an endeavour to help them through life. There are many points which can be raised re MV Rena, however, let me place just 3 for now. (i) Why was the offer to remove the containers by helicopter the day of the vessel hitting the reef denied...when the fee of $2 million was provided by the helicopter owner? Did no-one want to put their hand up to foot the bill? (ii) Why have engineers not dedicated just one full day to brace the cracked hull (in readiness for the next inevitable bad weather? (iii) Why were the engines turned off when they could have been left running to use approx 5 tons per hour (I have been told)of the dreaded fuel oil which would have most of the oil burnt up within approx only 10 days? Also, the allowing of the oil to cool has now made a farce of expecting the oil to be removed before the ship breaks in two. No-one is perfect, but do they really ‘think ahead' more than a couple of hours? Is there a dedicated place for us to provide our ideas? Michael Donovan (recreational local fisherman of approx 6 decades)

Rod Hale

I work in the oil and gas industry on a supply boat out in Western Australia and by coincidence was flying back into Tauranga for my month's leave the morning the motor vessel Rena was aground on the Astrolabe Reef.

When watching the evening news I am already surprised and feeling some concern when it seems not a great deal of activity is taking place to sort the problem. By the 2nd and 3rd day I was passing the comment ' this inaction has all the making of a Maritime version of a 'Pike River Mine Disaster' with the major problem of pollution from heavy fuel oil to add to the mix...

The last week of events have developed and the present scenario looking to go from bad to worse with containers adrift and still a full load of 1300 odd boxes on the ship plus another 1300 odd tonnes of fuel still onboard...

Now we really have serious issues prevailing on how to get the stuff off a broken ship and into a secure containment to bring ashore. Seems with a list of over 20 degree, broken hull amidships and a dead ship, (crew all gone and no ships power running), the salvage team now have the unenviable task of attempting to deal with these developments.

In the 'good old days' which was not that long ago actually, the commercial ports around New Zealand were run and controlled by the Harbour Master... the Harbour Master was an individual with a full maritime background. He was a 'Master Mariner'... that is, someone with a masters foreign going certificate, unlimited tonnage, years of experience in a sea-going capacity on world wide trade, working his way up through the ranks to Master over many years... By the time he had worked ashore as a Pilot and reached the position in the port of being the Harbour Master he would be both senior in years and experience...

Imagine the scenario that morning when the Rena went aground... suitable tugs would have been deployed to secure tow lines to the stern of the vessel, the bunkering barge would have been sent out to start unloading fuel from the ships bunker tanks, if needs be, the floating crane would have been sent out to start unloading deck cargo...

Unfortunately we don't have such individuals running our ports anymore. We have CEO's who achieved their position, not from a maritime background, but from the ability to take over organizations, trim them 'lean and mean', improve profitability and appease the shareholders, in other words, someone with a successful career in business management.

It is not only our ports which lack credible management as outlined above. Our newly named Maritime NZ (previously MSA) is also lacking the 'Master Mariner' in charge – this time we have a female CEO in charge, any nautical background there?

When the window of opportunity of the 1st four days was rapidly disappearing, why was there a decision made to transfer 700 tonnes of fuel from suspect tanks forward and amidships to the aft end of the vessel?

Should we now be surprised to see how the hull, flexing in heavy weather and a now in an overloaded aft condition, open up amidships? We should be asking did we not actually caused these sequence of events from our actions?

I doubt we would have much of the above taking place if the old style 'Harbour Master' had been in charge.